We derive algorithms for efficient secure numerical and logical operations in the semi-honest model ensuring statistical or perfect security. We focus on a recently introduced scheme for secure multi-party computation [14] . To derive our algorithms for trigonometric functions, we use basic mathematical laws in combination with properties of the additive encryption scheme in a novel way. For division and logarithm we use a new approach to compute a Taylor series at a fixed point for all numbers. All our logical operations such as comparisons and large fan-in AND gates are perfectly secure. Our empirical evaluation yields speed-ups for local computation of more than a factor of 100 for some operations compared to the state-of-the-art.
Introduction
Consider the following tasks: i) Identify people on a picture without looking at it; ii) Outsource computations giving away encrypted data and keeping keys private. Both tasks come with the challenge that there is no access to the data, which is obviously needed. Thus, it seems impossible to work on encrypted data only. Surprisingly, computing on encrypted data is indeed possible. A rather mature technique is secure multi-party computation relying on non-collusion of parties. To this date, secure multi-party computation suffers heavily from its performance overhead. Whereas a lot of emphasis has been put on optimizing the computation of Boolean circuits, only limited effort has been made to secure numerical operations efficiently. For example, prior work did not deal with trigonometric functions such as sine or cosine needed in many applications, such as signal processing in an industrial context. In fact, aside from basic operations (such as addition and multiplication) no complex mathematical operation can be carried out efficiently and accurately. Prior work uses either (slow) iterative schemes or approximations of the function to compute. We address this gap using a recent scheme called JOS [14] that explicitly separates between keys and encrypted values. It supports various encryptions, such as additive blinding or XORing of keys. The distinction between keys and encrypted values together with the simple encryption schemes lend itself well to make use of basic mathematical equations that relate the ciphertext, the plaintext and the key. In essence, to compute some functions we can use the same implementation (plus a few additional operations) used for plaintexts on the ciphertexts or keys as we show for trigonometric functions. This makes it possible to benefit from the long history of optimizations of implementations and algorithms for non-encrypted data. For illustration, our empirical evaluation yields that the amount of local computation per party to compute a sine function is only about a factor 2 more than for computation on non-encrypted data. At times, we also employ the idea of using multiple encryptions of the same plaintext to derive a system of equations to leverage operations on non-encrypted data. This is sometimes necessary to avoid insecure computation due to a reduced key space that is caused by the inability to evaluate certain functions designed for nonencrypted data on arbitrary keys. Additionally, we discuss a method for computing Taylor series based on scaling the secret value. The scaling makes it possible to develop the series at a fixed number (for the entire value range of a secret). This approach yields fast conversion for a large range of functions as we demonstrate for division and logarithm. For logical operations, the key ingredient is an efficient comparison protocol for equality (with zero) and for checking if a value is less than zero. This is done by using algorithms for conversions between encryption schemes and using Large Fan-In gates. Our ideas might prove valuable in other settings or using other schemes aside from JOS well.
Contributions
• Presenting the first algorithms for efficient computation of trigonometric functions such as sin, cos, tan on encrypted data. It provides statistical security using only five rounds, local computation proportional to computation without encryption and communication of O(k) bits where k is the security parameter. The introduced techniques might be of general interest.
• Stating an algorithm for computing Taylor series efficiently for a wide range of functions, demonstrated for division and logarithm. We improve the round complexity of the state-of-the-art [1, 5] for division and logarithm for computation on 32-bit floats and 64-bit double values by more than 10 rounds.
• Presenting an algorithm for division of a confidential number by a public divisor requiring only one round without the need to perform comparisons, which take significantly more than one round [4, 16] .
• Introducing a number of efficient operations using the JOS scheme [14] for comparison(equality, less than), conversion between different forms of encryptions and large fan-in gates that achieve comparable or better performance to prior work using different schemes. They require a constant number or almost constant rounds, ie. O(log * l) and O(log b l), where l is the number of bits of the encrypted value and b a parameter. In terms of local computation our equality protocol is more than a factor 100 faster than the state-of-the-art.
Outline
After some preliminaries (Section 1.3) focusing on summarizing the JOS scheme and presenting some notation and conventions, we discuss related work (Section 2). This is followed by introducing algorithms for three areas: conversions between encryption schemes (Section 3), logical operations (Section 4) and numerical operations (Section 5). There are some interdependencies between algorithms from different sections, eg. some conversion algorithms between encryption schemes are used by some algorithms for logical operations. Finally, we give a short empirical evaluation (Section 6).
Preliminaries and Notation
We briefly recapitulate notation and concepts from the JOS scheme [14] . For a secret value a ∈ [0, 2 l − 1] with l bits and a key K with b ≥ l bits we consider three kinds of linear encryptions EN C K (a): a + K, (a + K) mod 2 l and a ⊕ K. Given an encryption EN C K (a) we denote the effective maximum number of bits by the key or the encrypted value by l E . For EN C K (a) := (a + K) mod 2 l , we have l E = l. For additive encryption of a key K ∈ [0, 2 b − 1] with b bits, we have l E = b + 1 for a + K ≥ 2 b and l E = b, otherwise. Denote by subscript i the i th bit of a number in little Endian notation, eg. for a = 10: a 0 = 0 and a 1 = 1. In particular, E i , a i and K i denote the i th bit of EN C K (a), a and K. The scheme [14] uses three parties, namely: a key holder (KH), an encrypted value holder (EVH) and a helper (HE). The KH holds keys only (most of the time), the EVH keeps encrypted values (most of the time) and the helper can have either of them for a secret a, but it is not allowed to have both the encrypted value EN C K (a) and the matching key K. For additive encryption a + K, we define the carry bit c i to be the "carry over" bit that is added to a i+1 aside from k i+1 during encryption. Thus, by definition c 0 := 0 and c i := c i−1 + a i + k i for i > 0. Frequently, we encode 'TRUE' as one and 'FALSE' as zero. Our algorithms process as inputs encrypted values from the EVH and keys from the KH. They ensure the encrypted value of the result is held by the EVH and its key by the KH. For inputs and outputs we write an encrypted value and key as pair (EN C K (a), K). Thus, we write for a function f operating on an encryption of a returning an encrypted value re and key rk the following (re, rk) := f (EN C K (a), K). In particular, we use the multiplication protocol M U L [14] and the protocol for bitwise AND, ie. AN D. Both typically take two confidential numbers as input but for AN D we sometimes use larger Fan-Ins as described in [14] . We also assume a protocol for computing the power a i for a non-confidential integer i > 0, ie. power P OW ((EN C K (a), K), i). It can be implemented using the multiplication protocol M U L using O(log i) multiplications. To reduce the number of bits needed we also use scaled power computation SCALEDP OW ((EN C K (a), K), i, s), ie. for a scaling factor s we copute a i /s i−1 . We enumerate keys either by using primes, eg.
Related Work
The authors of this work recently proposed a novel scheme for secure multi-party computation (JOS) [14] using at least three parties. Since this work heavily relies on the scheme and its notations, JOS is discussed in more depth in Section 1.3. We are the first to build upon on [14] to enable complex numerical (and logical) operations. There is a significant body of work using classical works such as the GRR scheme [10] using Shamir's Secret sharing or the BGW scheme [3] for (complex) numerical computations, eg. [4, 1] . Other work [7, 13, 11, 1] is based on a library of primitive operations such as addition and multiplication (and, thus, potentially also GRR or BGW) to construct more complex operations. This kind of 'BlackBox' model has also been captured and formalized in [8] . Homomorphic encryption has also been employed for multi-party computations focusing on numerical or logical operations, eg. [9, 16] . More specifically, [8, 9] adopt threshold homomorphic encryption. Many schemes for logical and arithmetic functions, eg. [11, 7, 13] require protocols to compute (fast) unbounded fan-in AND gates. It is possible in (expected) constant number of rounds for arithmetic gates in [2] using Shamir's Secret Sharing. A number a i held by party i as EN C(a i ) = R i · a i · R −1 i−1 with R i being random matrices. We do not use ideas from [2] . Our approach to compute large fan-in AND gates is computationally more efficient than [2] , but might require more communication.
Operations on fixed-point numbers such as scaling, comparison, multiplication and division are discussed in [5] . For division, [5] requires 2Θ + 17 + 3 log(l) bits for a number of l bits and a parameter Θ giving the number of iterations, ie. the precision of the result. For a floating point number with 21 bit precision, this results in at least 38 rounds and for 52 bits at least 44 rounds. For division, [5] builds upon the Goldschmidt approximation. In contrast, we apply a Taylor series. Our complexity is O(log(l · n T )), where n T is the number of terms used in the Taylor series. For a 21 bit numbers we require at most 20 rounds, for double precision with 52 bits at most 30 rounds.
The first work to compute equality, comparison and discrete exponentiations in constant rounds was [7] . It relies on bit decompositions using O(l log l) multiplications, ie. obtaining a separate encrypted value for each bit of a secret as well as [2] to compute unbounded fan-in multiplication gates. Follow up work [13] improves on [7] by using bitwise shared secrets. The line of work [13, 7] is further enhanced by [11, 15] . Two (named) non-colluding parties and Paillier encryption are used i [15] for some operations. The state-of-the-art is [11] which leverages ideas from [15] . For equality [11] computes the Hamming Distance and compares it to zero using an l degree polynomial with l being the number of bits of a number. For "greater than" the idea is to check if the l/2 most significant bits are equal, and only if they differ check the l/2 least significant bits. This idea has been show to work well. It has been used also in [9, 13] . The two party case for integer comparison is elaborated in [9] . Our work does not contain polynomials but one of our protocols also uses the idea of computing the Hamming Distance for large fan-in gates, which helps in computing equality to 0. One difference is that we change encryptions (between XOR and additive).
Floating point operations such as addition, multiplication, division, square root, logarithm and exponentiation are given in [1] . The logarithm is computed using the relation log(a) = 2 log e · arctan( a−1 a+1 ) and a Taylor series approximation of arctan. The division is carried out using [5] . In contrast we compute the division using a Taylor series of 1/a using a fixed approximation point for all values a and scaling of the divisor a. Though [1] argues against using a Taylor series (directly on log), we show that for the JOS scheme in combination with our technique this does not seem to hold. More precisely, we fix the evaluation point of the series. In fact, our complexity for logarithm equals the complexity for division. Since we use less rounds than [5] for division and [1] uses [5] for division in the computation of the logarithm, we are also faster than [1] (by more than 10 rounds). The square root [1] is computed iteratively using the Babylonian formula for O(log l) rounds. Division of floating point numbers is also based on [5] . Exponentiation is performed by doing a bitwise decomposition. Most ideas from [1] would be applicable for JOS.
Other work compared quantitatively secure multiparty computation with respect to the function being a boolean circuit and the function being an arithmetic circuit over a large field [6] . This is also interesting in our context, since we show how to convert between bitwise XOR encryption (for Boolean circuits) and arithmetic encryption in a ring for the JOS scheme. Thus, one could the JOS scheme with other schemes (compared in [6] ) and pick the best algorithm for an operation.
Division using homomorphic encryption (Paillier) is shown in [16] as well as additive blinding assuming that the divisor is public. [16] performs approximate divisions, comparisons and min/max computations. In particular, they also use the fact that for a public divisor d we have (a+K)/d equals either a/d+k/d or a/d + k/d + 1. However, [16] (and also prior work [4] ) uses a comparison protocol to determine which of the two cases holds, which we do not require. In turn, we use scaling, ie. multiplication of a public number.
This needs less rounds (and local computation) than comparison. The work of [4] also investigated upon primitives for secure multiparty computations for integers with focus on comparison and truncation.
Conversions between Encryptions
We show how to convert between all three encryption schemes, ie. XOR, additive with and without modulo.
Additive ↔ XOR Encryption
Algorithm AddToXOR calculates an XOR encryption of a secret from an additive encryption(with or without modulo). It uses the carry bits algorithm in Section 4.5 1 and it exploits the definition of the carry bit c i to get XOR encryptions of the bits: For
Thus, the XOR encrypted bits as in algorithm AddToXOR are given by
1 Due to the dependencies among algorithms, it is not possible to avoid referencing later sections of the paper without removing a consequent structuring of the paper into three main sections (encryption conversions, logical and numerical operations).
Algorithm XORtoADD to perform the opposite conversion is more involved. Both the KH and the helper make decisions depending on a key bit of the additive encryption. The helper deals with getting the encrypted bits for the EVH. The later needs some input that also depends on the encrypted values. Since the helper makes its decision based on key bits, the EVH 'double' encrypts bits before sending them to the helper. Since we compute separate additively encrypted bits, we must combine them into one encrypted value. Clearly, for arithmetic rings this requires that all of them stem from the same arithmetic ring, eg. to add numbers a + K mod 2 l and
l ′ , yielding we should have that l = l ′ , otherwise it is not clear, which modulo to take (e.g. mod 2
l or mod 2 l ′ ) for the added keys K + K ′ and the added encrypted values. We address this problem by encrypting bit i using a key with 2 l−i bits, and scaling by 2 i transforming all bits to the same arithmetic ring before computing their sum.
More mathematically, we compute an additively encrypted number EN C K ′ (a) (optionally, modulo 2 l ) encrypted bits and keys e i , K i with e i = a i ⊕ K i . We obtain additively encrypted values for each bit a i , where bit i is encrypted with a key of l − i bits. To combine them into a single additively encrypted value, we multiply each additively encrypted bit a i with 2 i (and also the keys of the bit), yielding that each encryption for all bits i is of the same length l (and so are the keys). To get an additive encryption of bit a i , we reveal to the helper the key K and double encrypted values (with XOR and additive), ie. EN C K ′′ i (e i ). The helper uses the following observations: If the key bit K i is zero then the plaintext equals the ciphertext, ie. e i = a i . If the key bit is one then a i = ¬e i = 1 − e i . The key step is the last equation: We can express the Boolean negation operation in terms of an arithmetic operation. This is important, since the helper cannot directly compute 1 − e i since it obtains e i additively encrypted, ie.
Since the KH also knows K i , it knows how bit i got encrypted, ie. whether to use K ′′−1 i or K ′′ i . Note, that the helper cannot disclose any information to the EVH that depends on the key. Thus, it must encrypt its findings (using a key K ′′′ i ) before returning results to the EVH.
Purely Additive ↔ Additive Modulo Encryption
Taking the modulo 2 l of the ciphertext and key yields the modulo encryption using a purely additive encryption, ie. the EVH computes EN C K ′ (a) = (a + K) mod 2 l and the KH computes K ′ = K mod 2 l . For the opposite conversion we must take care of the the carry bit. This is done, by prepending it to the additive modulo encryption. More precisely, to convert an additively encryption EN C K (a) (using modulo) to an additive encryption without modulo EN C K ′ (a) with a key K ′ of b > l bits requires removing the carry bit c l that might occur when reencrypting EN C K (a) with key K ′ . More precisely, when adding EN C K (a) + K −1 + K ′ , we get in case of the carry bit c l being one: EN C K ′ (a + 2 l ). Otherwise, we get for c l being 0: EN C K ′ (a). Both,
To remove the potential 2 l , we compute the carry bit le := c l = LessZero(EN C K (a), K) and then using confidential value le we get EN C K (a) + le · 2 l , which yields the desired additive encryption.
Logical Operations
We begin by stating an algorithm for the Hamming Distance (Section 4.1). The Hamming Distance is helpful for computing large fan-in gates (Section 4.2). The comparison of a number with zero (Section 4.3) is a simple application of large fan-in gates, whereas less than zero relies on a straight forward use of the algorithm AddToXOR (Section 4.4). Comparing a number to zero is a necessary sub-procedure in our algorithm for computing carry bits given the sum of two numbers and one summand (Section 4.5).
Hamming Distance
For several logical operations we use the Hamming Distance of an encrypted value and its key. The idea is that the Hamming Distance is zero if and only if the confidential value is zero, ie. a = 0 ⇔ EN C K (a) = K (for all our encryptions schemes). In general, the Hamming distance gives the number of distinct bits for two numbers x, y of l bits. It is defined as H(x, y) := i∈[0,l−1] x i + y i − 2x i y i . Our algorithm 5 computes H(EN C K (a), K), where a can be encrypted using an arbitrary scheme. To compute the Hamming distance of an encrypted value and a key, the EVH can sum up the bits e i of the encrypted value and the KH sums up the key bits k i . Rather than computing e i · k i we compute e i ∧ k i and convert this to additive encryption to be able to compute the sum. Algorithm 5 requires five rounds.
Algorithm 5
Hamming Distance H(encrypted values EN C K (a), key K)
Large Fan-In Gates
We present three methods, one based on Hamming Distances, one based on recursive computation using a procedure for fan-in gates of some fixed width and one that combines ideas of both. For Boolean Circuits, the AND of an unbounded number of terms, ie. ∧ i∈[0,w−1] a i can be computed in O(log * l) rounds using the Hamming Distance. The idea is that we sum up all w negated bits a i . The AND of all them is true, if all a i 's are one, ie. the sum of negated bits is zero. This idea is realized in Algorithm FanInHamming.
Algorithm 6 FanInHamming(encrypted values
EN C Ki (a i ), keys K i with i ∈ [0, w − 1]) 1: E¬ := ¬EN CK (a) {by EVH, bitwise negation} 2: (EN C K 0 (H (0) ), K 0 ) := AddT oXOR(H(E¬, K), K ′ ) {Resultof Hamming distance converted to XOR encryption} 3: For i = 1 to ⌈log * (lE + 1)⌉ do 4:(EN C K i (H (i) , K i ) := AddT oXOR(H(EN C K i−1 (H (i−1) ), K i−1 ), K ′i−1 ){number of bits of Ki and encryption is reduced logarithmically} 5: return(¬EN C K ⌈log * l E ⌉ (H (⌈log * l E ⌉ )), K ⌈log * l E ⌉ ))
{EVH negates its value}
To compute the ANDed term, JOS allows to trade round complexity and message size. More precisely, fan-in gates of size base can be computed with messages of size 2 base in two rounds. Thus, we partition the expression of l E bits into terms of size base and recursively compute the AN D of all partial results as shown in Algorithm FanInBase. For notational convenience assume l E is a power of base, ie. l E := base j for some integer j ≥ 0. The total number of rounds is then 2 log base l E .
Algorithm 7
FanInBase(encrypted values EN C K (a), keys K)
E := E ′ {by EVH, bit length lE of E is only a fraction 1/base of E ′ } 4: end while 5: return E, K An even faster algorithm FanInBoth could be achieved when combining ideas from both algorithms. FanInHamming requires 5 · log * n rounds with messages of size l (with l being the keysize), whereas FanInBase requires 2 log base l rounds with messages of size up to base · 2 base . The exponential growth of the message size makes FanInBase only practical for small values of base. To combine both algorithms we first compute the Hamming Distance recursively for i < log * n recursions, yielding a number of length log (i) l bits (with log (i) l being the i times iterated logarithm) and then run algorithm FanInBase. The total runtime is given by 5 · i + 2 log base log (i) l. The exact parameters i, base depend on network parameters such as bandwidth and latency and the hardware of the machines involved.
Equality to Zero
Given confidential value a XOR encrypted we compute whether a equals zero, ie. a ? = 0, such that the EVH holds the encryption EN C Keq (a ? = 0) and the KH the key K eq .
Protocol EqualZeroFan uses the fact that the secret a is equal to 0, if all its bits a i equal 0. Thus, a is zero, if the AND of all negated bits is one, ie. a 
Less Zero Comparison
For a secret a encrypted additively with key K, ie. EN C K (a) = a + K (potentially, mod 2 l ) we compute whether a is less than zero, ie. a ? < 0. We assume that a is given in two's complement. For two complement one bit is reserved for the sign. Thus, we encrypt the number using XOR (by Algorithm XORToAdd) and return the sign bit a l−1 of the XOR encryption.
Carry Bits
We compute the carry bits c i that result due to encryption, ie. addition of two summands a and Algorithm 9 LessZero(encrypted value EN C K (a) with l > 1 bits, key K)
K. Since a is secret we can only use the sum, ie. the encryption, and a summand, ie. the key, to get the carry bits. Note, that c i = 1 ⇐⇒ EN C K (a) mod 2 i < K mod 2 i and c i = 0 otherwise. To see this, assume that c i = 0, ie. there is no carry over when adding the last i bits of the key and the plaintext. Mathematically speaking,
i . Assume c i = 1, then we must account for the carry bit by adding it, ie.
In Algorithm CarryBits the modulo of the ciphertext and key can be computed without communication. However, for the comparison, ie. EN C K (a) mod 2 i −K mod 2 i < 0, we must encrypt K mod 2 i using a key
i . Finally, we do the comparison of the modulo values yielding the carry bits.
Numerical Operations
Before diving into numerical operations we discuss a supporting algorithm, ie. in Section 5.1 we show how to obtain the index of the most significant bit(MSB) of a number. This algorithm is used for computing the division and logarithm of a confidential number using a Taylor series (see Section 5.2). Section 5.3 states procedures for dividing and multiplying an encrypted value by a non-confidential value. Section 5.4 discusses how to calculate the sine, cosine and tangent function.
Index of MSB
The index of the most significant bit (MSB) of a positive number a encrypted additively (potentially, mod 2 l ) is calculated by investigating bit by bit. We begin from the highest order bit and move towards the lowest order bit. For each bit i of a we check if it is set, ie. a i = 1. This is done by subtracting 2 i from the plaintext for all i < l (using two's complement) and checking if the result of the substraction is less than zero. The comparison yields a sequence of l bits le i of the form 1...10...0, such that all le i are 1 for a < 2 i and 0 otherwise. We can compute the sum s of all bits le i . Thus, the index of the MSB is then l − s. Sometimes, we are interested in computing the power of the index 2 l−s which is computed by XORing one bit with the next, ie. pos i := le i ⊕ le i+1 , yielding a number 0...010...0 through concatenation, ie. 2 l−s := pos l |pos l−1 |...|pos 0 . Depending on the application, we might only compute the MSB and not 2 MSB .
Taylor Series: Division and Logarithm
We present a technique to compute the Taylor series of any function f on a secret value a. The Taylor series corresponds to a function that approximates function f . For a Taylor series we require a value a T for which we 'develop' the series. The error of the series depends on the properties of f and typically the difference a − a T between the point used for developing the series and the point a for which we wish Choose random Kli {by KH}
3:
KH sends (2 l − K + Kli) mod 2 l to EVH 4:
and ele l := 0} 9: kposi := klei ⊕klei+1 {by KH,i ∈ [0, l−1] and kle l := 0} 10: eP ow2M SB := epos l |epos l−1 |...|epos0 {by EVH, concatenation of bits giving 2 msb } 11: kP ow2M SB := kpos l |kpos l−1 |...|kpos0 {by KH, concatenation of bits giving 2 msb } 12: return (eM SB, kM SB) and (eP ow2M SB, kP ow2M SB)) {Pow2MSB encrypted using XOR} to compute (an approximation of) f . Our technique is efficient as long as the Taylor series converges fast given that the secret a and point for developing a T differ by less than 50%, ie. |(a − a T )/a T | < 0.5 and the function f can be expressed using a scaled value
, f (1/s)) for a function g like addition or multiplication. For instance, for division we have 1/a = 1/a ′ · s and, thus, g is the multiplication function. Thus, the technique relies on scaling the secret, which allows to use the same point for developing the series for any secret. More precisely, we scale the secret a such that any scaled value lies within a fixed interval, where the lower and upper bound differs only by a factor of 2. We keep the scaling factor secret. This allows to choose the arithmetic mean (or any other value) out of this fixed interval as a point a T for developing any Taylor series (for any function f ). Thus, this fixed value a T reveals nothing about the secret a and does not have to be kept secret. In turn, this significantly simplifies computation, since large portions of the series can be computed on non-encrypted data, as we demonstrate in detail for division and logarithm.
For division we compute the inverse 1/a of a confidential value a ∈ [1, 2 l − 1]. This allows to compute any division of type b/a with both values being confidential by simply multiplying b and 1/a. Assume we are given a secret a ∈ [1, 2 l − 1] and a scaled value a ′ = a · s of a such that a ′ ∈ [2 l−1 , 2 l − 1] for some constant l. We develop the Taylor series around a fixed point a T lying in the middle of the interval, ie. a T := 2 l−1 + 2 l−2 . The Taylor series for 1/a ′ around a T is given by f (a
. If we cut the series after n t terms, we can compute an upper bound on the error term e nt , using
To get 21-bit float precision we need n t = 7. To get 52-bit double precision we need n t = 13.
The Taylor series of log(a ′ ) around a T is given by
Let us discuss the computation of the Taylor series in more detail. We start by scaling the confidential value a with value
always has l bits. The scaling factor s is computed in three steps starting from getting the most significant bit P ow2msb, which is encrypted using XOR of the key. For instance, for a secret 1011 with l = 6, we obtain (encrypted) P ow2msb = 01000. The second step reverses this bit pattern to get RevP ow = 00010 by simple reordering of the bits (without computation). Finally, we change the encryption of RevP ow from XOR to additive. A key step is to compute the powers of (a ′ − a T ) i for i ∈ [2, n T ]. The first power is simply obtained by computing a ′ −a T . The other powers can be computed using log log N multiplications, ie. we iteratively square the value t := (a ′ − a T ) to get t 2 , t 4 , t 8 and multiply the newly obtained squared term with all prior multiplication results. For instance, in the first round of multiplication we get t 2 , in the second
We might also use larger Fan-in Gates to compute all terms up to t nt using a constant number of rounds.
Multiplication and Division by a Non-confidential Value
The product a·c can be computed without communication, if the EVH multiplies the encrypted value of a by the non-confidential value c (optionally, modulo 2 l ) and the KH computes the product of the key and c (optionally, modulo 2 l ). Division a/c for two values c, a, where c is nonconfidential and a is additively encrypted (without modulo) can be done in two rounds. For EN C K (a)/c and K/c, it might not hold that We obtain the division however with arbitrary precision using scaling as follows. The EVH calculates ⌊(2 k · EN C K (a))/c⌋ for an integer k > log c. The KH computes K ′ = ⌊(2 k · K)/c⌋ and chooses a random K ′′ , it computes K ′′ − K ′ and transmits this to the EVH, which computes
). This can be done by discarding the last k bits. The KH computes the final key Kf = K ′′ /2 k by discarding the last k bits of K ′′ .
Remark: At the expense of a longer proof one can also show that 2 k ≥ c suffices. 
{To get log(a) subtract log(RevP ow) from log(a ′ ) = log(a) + log(RevP ow)} 24: elog(a) := elog(a ′ ) − emsb {by EVH} 25: klog(a) := klog(a ′ ) − kmsb {by KH} 26: return (eInv(a)),kInv(a)) and (elog(a),klog(a))) NonConfDivisionAdditiveEnc(encrypted value EN C K (a), key K,constant c)
1: {Constant c is a fixed point number with scaling factor s = 2 k for some k} 2: divs := k + s {Scaling for division, 2 s is precision (scaling factor) of a} 3: EN CK (a/c) :
−k means shifting to the right if k > 0, otherwise to the left} 4:
s) the sum of remainders rem(2 k K, c) + rem(2 k a, c) is at most (c − 1) + (c − 1). Thus, the result is wrong if 2(c − 1)/2 k ≥ 1 ⇐⇒ c − 1 ≥ 2 k−1 . However, by assumption 2 k−1 ≥ c and thus, the result is correct.
Trigonometric functions
We compute three trigonometric functions, namely sine, cosine and tangent, given an additive encrypted value a, ie. EN C K (a) := a + K (without modulo). We discuss two methods. The first method is best for sin, cos:
We describe only sin (cos is analogous). The KH can compute sin(K).
The EVH computes t 0 := 2 · sin( 2 ). Then we multiply (securely) t 0 and t 1 and subtract sin(K). Note, that the above formulas do not require integers. Generally, secret a will not be an integer, but rather a fixed point number (and so will be the key and encrypted value). Algorithm 14 describes an approach that used fixed point integers.
For the second method, we use two encryptions of a with keys K and K ′ . We only discuss the tangent function. Note, that one could also compute the tan- ) {by 
18: ekf := eak/s {by EVH} 19: kf := kak/s + sin(K) · s {by KH} 20: return (ekf, kf ) gent using tan(x) = sin(x)/ cos(x):
Subtracting Equation (2) from (1) gives:
In Equation (3) all terms tan(·) of the denominator de tan := tan(K)− tan(K ′ )+ tan(a+ K ′ )− tan(a+ K) can be computed by the KH and EVH locally and then aggregated securely. The enumerator no tan := tan(a + K ′ ) tan(K ′ ) − tan(a + K) tan(K) can also be computed securely. For performance reasons, the division de tan /no tan could be carried out using the helper and revealing no tan to it, though this might pose security risks: The helper could compute 1/no tan using the decrypted value no tan and then we can compute the product de tan ·1/no tan on encrypted values. To avoid division by zero (or by values close to zero) or division by infinity (or close to infinity 3 ) we require the following conditions for some constants k,c 2 and c 3 :
The first inequalities (including inequality (4)) avoid division by small values. The last two avoid dealing with very large values in the nominator or denominator. Let us discuss the impact of these inequalities on the range of suitable keys. For the derivative of tan(x) holds d tan(x)/dx = 1/ cos(x) 2 ≥ 1. Thus, | tan(x)| ≥ |x|. Since tan(x) is periodic with period π, let us focus on the range x ∈ [−π/2, π/2]. This yields for the first two inequalities that each eliminates all keys K with |K| > k · c 2 . The third means also that we eliminate another range of width k · c 2 . Continuing in this manner and assuming that all ranges for keys that must be excluded are disjoint, the range of non-useful keys becomes 3k · c 2 + 2/k + 4 · c 3 out of a range [−π/2, π/2] of width π of possible keys. Setting k = 1/ √ c 2 and c 2 = 0.0001 and c 3 < 1e19 the probability to choose two suitable keys K, K ′ , when choosing them randomly is still 0.999. When using n p pairs of keys K, K ′ the probability that all key pairs are non-suitable becomes 0.001 np . To ensure that the above conditions on the tangent of keys and ciphertext are fulfilled the KH could repeatedly select keys and the EVH could tell the KH to reencrypt values until all conditions are fulfilled. However, biasing the choice of keys might lead to an insecure scheme. Thus, our approach is to compute the tangent multiple times using different key pairs, but substitute dummy values for tan(·) in case a party detects a violation upon the conditions. We select the results of all computations of tan(a) that did not violate any condition and return their average. More precisely, we let the KH choose a fixed number n p of pairs of keys P i = (K i , K ′i ). The KH sets the bit S K (i) equal 1 for all pairs P i for which the conditions on the keys are satisfied. Analogously, the EVH checks the conditions for tan on the encrypted values and sets bits S E (i) analogously to S K (i). Let de tan (i) and no tan (i) be the denominator and nominator in Equation (3) using the i th pair. For every i with S K (i) = 1 the KH uses 1 rather than tan(K i ) and 2 rather than tan(K ′i ). For every i with S E (i) = 1 the EVH uses 3 rather than tan(a + K i ) and 7 rather than tan(a + K ′i ). This yields a sequence t i := no tan (i)/de tan (i), where some t i might correspond to tan(a) and others might not do so due to a violation of the constraints (4. We compute the sum of all results weighted by the product of 1−S K (i) and 1 − S E (i), which essentially sets invalid results t i to 0 and take the average of the weighted terms. We compute ( i no tan (i)/de tan (i) · (1 − S E (i)) · (1 − S K (i)))/( i (1 − S E (i)) · (1 − S K (i))).
Empirical Evaluation
We evaluated the overhead for equality and the sine function of 32bit unsigned integers compared to the state of the art in C++. We ran our experiments on an Intel Core i5. We compare in terms of computation and communication. For the result of sine we used a fixed point number with 24 bits precision. 4 Note, that to obtain a result of this precision requires higher precision for the computation on encrypted values. For a key K having b bits, a secrect a having l bits we must compute (the sine) using b + 1 rather than l bits. To compute the sine function, we used a key of size 50 bits. We used 53 bits precision for the sine of the keys and encrypted value.
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For equality we implemented the algorithm EqualZeroFan. and the algorithm in [11] using GRR [10, 12] relying on Shamir's Secret Sharing for secure additions/multiplications. [11] relies on an expensive preprocessing phase for each comparison. We implemented GRR with improvements [12] using the NTL lib 6 . For GRR we used a 33 bit prime.
Computational performance is shown in Table 1 , where we computed the average time per operation per party in microseconds using 10 million operations. We used the slowest party for each scheme (for GRR all parties perform the same computations).
The amount of communication is given in Table 2.  Table 2 is based on pre-shared keys between each pair of parties, eg. by exchanging a single key and then using this key as input for a pseudo random number generator for all of the 10 Mio. operations. For [11] using GRR each party sends two messages with 33 bits each per multiplication for the online phase. The preprocessing phase per operation of [11] is very expensive. In many settings, such as the one for ABB, expensive preprocessing might not be viable. 
Conclusions
This work has given new approaches to compute complex functions with little computational overhead. Additionally, we have also presented several efficient protocols for logical operations. We believe that this work together with the JOS scheme paves the road to make secure multi-party computation practical in a number of (industrial) applications.
